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NOTES
COMMON MARKET ANTITRUST LAW: JURISDICTION:
LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY ARTICLE 85(1) OF
THE TREATY OF ROME
Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome1 prohibits restrictive agreements
and practices which have the object of distorting competition within
the Common Market and which are likely to affect trade between the
Member States. When properly analyzed these twin conditions are seen
to embody three requirements which must be satisfied before a par-
ticular restraint becomes violative of Article 85(1): (1) the restraint must
have as its object or effect the distortion of competition; (2) it must
touch upon competition within the Common Market; and (3) it must
touch upon interstate trade.2 Requirements (2) and (3) are jurisdictional;
they point to the effects that a restraint must produce within the Com-
mon Market before Community tribunals can proceed against those
responsible for it. Requirement (1), on the other hand, embodies the
substantive criteria of Community cartel law.
This note is not concerned with the ways in which restrictive agree-
ments and practices can be found to satisfy Requirement (1). Rather,
the object of its inquiry is to explore the legal meaning of the jurisdic-
tional requirements of Article 85(1) with particular emphasis on their
significance for the extraterritorial applicability of Common Market
antitrust law. Requirement (2), the "domestic effects" clause, defines the
scope of the Commission's territorial jurisdiction over restraints which
satisfy the criteria of Requirement (1). Requirement (3), the interstate
trade clause, insures that the restraint is a proper subject for Community,
as opposed to Member State, cartel law.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11. An unofficial English translation is set forth together with the official
French and German texts at 1 CCH Comm. MaT. REP. 2005 (emphasis added):
Article 85(1): The following practices shall be prohibited as incompatible with
the Common Market: all agreements between undertakings, all decisions by
associations of undertakings and all concerted practices which are liable to affect
trade between Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict or
distort competitior within the Common Market or which have this effect....
2. Interstate trade, in the context of Common Market antitrust law, refers to trade
between Member States.
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REQUIREMENT (8): IMPAIRMENT OF TRADE
BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES
A. THE BAsic ISSUE
For the Commission to have jurisdiction to proceed against parties
responsible for an alleged distortion of competition it must be found that
the suspect restraint touches upon interstate trade.8 To grasp the legal
significance of this "touching" requirement, there must first be a basic
familiarity with the ways in which interstate trade may be affected by
an illegal cartel. Thus, the abstract concepts "distortion of competition"
and "interstate trade" must be considered in the context of the world
of commerce; moreover, the facts which will indicate their presence and
character must be identified.
A restrictive practice or agreement is reflected in the conduct of the
enterprises which are parties to it.4 Interstate trade refers to the actual
movement of goods in commerce and also to the potential channels along
which such goods might move; it involves actual and potential trading
relationships between trading partners located in different Member
States.5 The basic issue is whether the suspect restraint is likely to
result in an impairment of interstate trade. The analytical problem is
to articulate the mechanisms by which a cartel, operating through the
conduct of its members, can produce effects on the members' actual
and potential trading relationships that will be sufficient to empower
3. Recall that the actual language of the Treaty, supra note 1, requires that the sus-
pect restraint be "liable to affect trade between Member States" (emphasis added). It is
to be kept in mind that the interstate trade clause is primarily a jurisdictional require-
ment. This is in marked contrast to the role played by its American cousin in the Act
of July 2, 1890 (Sherman Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). The interstate trade (and commerce)
clause in American antitrust law has considerably more substantive clout by comparison.
4. The "domestic effects" clause also requires that we identify the actual market
manifestations of distortions of competition. There, however, the emphasis will be on
locating the situs of the distorted activity. Here we are concerned with the effects of the
restraint on the conduct of the parties involved insofar as that conduct is capable of
affecting interstate trade.
5. The concept of "trade" can be viewed as pointing either to the exchange of goods,
or to trading relationships, or to both. The judicial treatment of the interstate trade
clause in the Community tribunals has focused principally upon the freedom of parties
to develop trading relationships. The "interstate" qualification raises additional prob.
lems. Interstate trade might be construed to refer to those goods which move across
national boundaries, or it might be taken to mean relationships between trading part-
ners located in different Member States, or both. It is not clear from the cases that one
interpretation has been chosen to the exclusion of the others by Community tribunals.
However, as with the interpretation of "trade," the primary emphasis seems to have
been on trading relationships rather than movement of goods.
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the Commission to act upon the issue of the cartel's permissibility under
Article 85(l).
B. THE GRUNDIG-CoNsTEN SINGLE MARYET TEST
The Court of Justice, in Consten and Grundig v. E.E.C. Commission,
gave this formulation of the test to be applied in ascertaining whether
a particular restraint is likely to affect trade between the Member
States:
In this connection, it is especially important to know whether the agreement
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, is capable of jeopardizing the
freedom of trade between Member States in such a manner as to prejudice the
realization of the objectives of a single market between States.7
A convenient starting point in attempting to analyze the meaning of
the single market test as applied in a particular factual situation is to
isolate the market sector involved.8 Once the relevant market sector has
6. Consten and Grundig v. E.E.C. Commission, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder: Court
Decisions] CCH CoMMs. MKT. REP. 1 8046, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418 (Eur. Ct. of Justice
1966) [hereinafter cited as Grundig-Consten].
7. Consten and Grundig v. E..C. Commission, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder: Court
Decisions] CCH Comma. MKT. REP. 8046, at 7652, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418, 472 (Eur.
Ct. of Justice 1966). In Socidt Technique Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, [1961-
1966 Transfer Binder: Court Decisions] CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 8047, at 7696, 5
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357, 375 (Eur. Ct. of Justice 1966) (emphasis added), the Court used
an alternative phraseology, saying that "it is necessary to know whether [the restraint]
is capable of partitioning the market in certain products between Member States and
of thus rendering the economic interpenetration sought by the Treaty more difficult."
It is apparent that the Court's intention in the early years of Community cartel law
was to use Article 85(1) as a tool to help achieve economic interpenetration. Although
this is an important objective for the EEC, it is not the traditional aim of American
antitrust statutes, i.e, regulation of competition. It will be seen that the standards sired
by the single market objective do not function particularly well when applied to re-
straints which are designed to provide a competitive advantage but which are not con-
cerned with national boundaries.
8. In Grundig-Consten, a German manufacturer of radios, Grundig, conferred exclu-
sive distributorship rights upon the French distributor, Consten. Because the Commis-
sion has adopted a quantitative standard of perceptibility, so as to exclude from the
prohibitions of Article 85(1) agreements whose effects are insignificant, it makes a dif-
ference whether the relevant market sector is narrowly or broadly defined. Notice of
May 27, 1970, Relating to Agreements, Decisions and Concerted Practices of Minor Im-
portance Not Coming Within Art. 85(1), 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 9367 (Engl. transl.
& summary 1970). The quantitative standards of perceptibility set forth in the Com-
mission announcement are grounded in the Court of Justice's decision in Volk v. Ver-
vaecke, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder: Court Decisions] CCH CoMM. MzT. RE'. 8074,
at 8086, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 273 at 282 (Bur. Ct. of Justice 1969):
[Aln agreement does not come within the prohibition of Article 85(1) where, in
view of the weak position of the parties on the market of the products in ques-
tion, its effect on the market is insignificant.
Thus, the agreement in Grundig-Consten would be more likely to impair the freedom
of interstate trade in Grundig radios than it would if trade in all radios, or in elec-
tronic devices generally, were taken to be the pertinent sector. Without addressing itself
specifically to this issue, the Court in Grundig-Consten opted for the narrow interpreta-
tion, focusing its inquiry on trade between Germany and France in Grundig products.
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been isolated it is necessary to identify the potential trading partners
for that sector, and then group them according to geographical location.9
The factual inquiry comes into critical focus when it seeks to identify
the effects of the restraint on the freedom of potential trading partners
to engage in interstate trade.10 The terms of the exclusive distributor-
ship agreement in Grundig-Consten were such as to give Consten abso-
lute territorial protection." All French enterprises other than Consten
were prohibited from importing Grundig radios into France; simul-
taneously, Consten was barred from re-exporting to other Community
States. Hence, as a result of the restrictive agreement, a number of
potential trading partners in different Community States were not free
to deal with each other.
The freedom of potential trading partners to deal with one another
is simply one indication of their freedom to engage in interstate trade.
As a result of the Grundig-Consten holding the following may be
viewed as the minimal requirement: there can be no freedom to engage
in interstate trade where potential trading partners are prevented from
dealing with one another.
According to the Grundig-Consten test, impairments of freedom of
trade between the Member States become violative of the interstate
trade clause when they erect a barrier to the realization of a single mar-
ket between the Member States. For this determination, it is necessary
to compare the trading freedom of potential partners, as affected by the
suspect restraint, with what that freedom would be if the goal of
economic interpenetration were a reality. Looking again to the Grundig-
9. On the Grundig-Consten facts, enterprises which might potentially deal in Grundig
radios include the manufacturer, distributors, and retailers. It is not clear from the
decision whether it is necessary to consider consumers, manufacturers, and distributors
of component parts, or others less directly connected with the distribution of the
products involved. Geographically, the relevant parties included the German manu-
facturer, Grundig; the French distributor, Consten; other French distributors; and
German retailers.
10. The actual working of the Grundig-Consten test, supra note 7 and accompanying
text, requires an impairment of "freedom of interstate trade," which is to be deter-
mined through the application of the single market standard. Use of the phrase "free-
dom to engage in interstate trade" does not alter the criteria that are to be applied; it
merely gives the concept a specific referent. Freedom of interstate trade is identical to
the freedom of potential trading partners to engage in interstate trade.
11. In SA. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder: Court Decisions] CCH Coanm. MaT. RE'. 8053, 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 26 (Eur.
Ct. of Justice 1967), the Court gave explicit recognition to a principle silently applied
in Grundig-Consten, namely that an agreement must be considered together with all
the other agreements that surround it. Grundig had entered into similar exclusive dis-
tributorship arrangements with firms in the other Member States.
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Common Market Antitrust Law
Consten facts, in a single, Community-wide market Grundig and other
Community sellers of its radios would be free to deal with all French
buyers; similarly, Consten would be free to export the Grundig product
to buyers in other Member States. But, as a result of the exclusive
distributorship agreement, the French market in Grundig radios was
partitioned off from the rest of the Community. Accordingly, the agree-
ment was held to be likely to impair trade between the Member States.12
An analysis of the Grundig-Consten decision, while helpful in illustrat-
ing the ultimate factual issues which underlie the practical application
of the single market test, contributes little to the resolution of the most
significant issue raised by the test articulated therein: What kinds of
limitations on trading freedom will prejudice the realization of a single,
Community-wide market? For the answer to this question, which is really
an exploration of the criteria locked within the concept of a single
market,18 we must turn to an examination of post Grundig-Consten
case law.
C. POST GRUNDIG-CONSTEN CASE LAw: ExPANIsioN oF THE
SINGLE MARUr CONCEPT
A thorough examination of post Grundig-Consten case law reveals that
few opportunities arose for the application of an expanded single market
test. In almost every instance in which the Commission found an
impairment of trade between the Member States, it also could find that
the restraint absolutely prohibited a party from dealing with some
potential trading partner in another Member State.14 It is with regard
to the few cases in which the Commission faced horizontal restraints
12. Where the restrictive agreement prevents potential trading partners from dealing
with one another, as was the case in Grundig-Consten, an absolute barrier is raised to
the economic interpenetration contemplated by the single market test.
13. As long as the single market test remains the sole standard by which to measure
the impact of a particular restraint on interstate trade, the kinds of interferences that
will contravene the interstate trade clause will be determined by the criteria which find
expression under the single market test. Thus, the expansion of Commission jurisdic-
tion under the interstate trade clause can be seen as an expansion of the concept of a
single market.
14. This result is not surprising in light of the Commission's statement that primary
emphasis during the first ten years of Community competition policy was on restraints
which jeopardized the unity of the Common Market. Commission Report on Competi-
tion Policy, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 9507 (1972). As a result of this ordering of
priorities, agreements designed to regulate competition in the Common Market without
partitioning it along national boundaries were given less attention. It is also significant
that most of the cases during this period involved vertical restraints in which one party
to the agreement was expressly given some measure of territorial protection.
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that the single market test began to betray the presence of additional
criteria within it, criteria that would enable the Commission to exercise
its jurisdiction over agreements that were considerably less restrictive of
trading freedom than the exclusive distributorship restraints held to be
violative of the interstate trade clause under Grundig-Consten.5
In the European Machine-Tool Expositions case,'( the Trade Associa-
tion CECIMO promulgated rules which had the effect of impairing
interstate trade in machine tools.17 The potential trading partners in-
cluded manufacturers located in virtually every Community State, on
the one hand, and their potential customers, located throughout the
Common Market, on the other. The exhibition ban imposed by the
Association Rules upon its members made it more difficult for these
producers to cultivate contacts and conclude transactions with potential
buyers in geographically distant areas of the Community. This, in turn,
made interstate trade in machine tools less feasible, thereby satisfying
the conditions of the interstate trade clause.' s
15. In its decision not to challenge a suspect restraint involving the Kodak group,
Commission Decision of June 80, 1970, 2 CCH Com. MaT. REP. 9878, 9 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. D19 (Comm'n of the EEC 1970), the Commission refused to proceed against parties
involved in a vertical restraint which effectively limited the volume of goods that could
be sold to potential buyers in other Member States. By including in all of their sales
contracts a prohibition on exportation of goods to markets outside the Common Mar-
ket, the Kodak companies were curtailing the freedom of buyers to decide for themselves
the quantity of goods that they would purchase. The Commission failed to view this
as prejudicial to the realization of a single market between States, even though the
goods would be sold once within the Community on their way to foreign markets.
16. Commission Decision of March 13, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Develop-
ments] CCH Comr. MKT. REP. 9295, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. Dl (Comm'n of the EEC
1969) [hereinafter cited as Machine-Tool]. Virtually all the leading manufacturers of
machine tools in Europe, including those from non-Community countries, belong to the
Trade Association Comitd Europden de Codperation des Industries de la Machine-Outil(CECIMO). The Association's rules provide, inter alia, that members of CECIMO who
chose to exhibit their products in the Association's biennial Trade Fair (EEMO) were
prohibited from exhibiting at other fairs held during that year in other Common
Market countries. Although held to be in violation of Article 85(1), the agreement
qualified for an exemption under the provisions of Article 85(3) and was therefore
allowed to stand. For an English translation of Article 85(3), together with an explana-
tion of its significance for Common Market antitrust law, see 1 CCH COMm. MKT. REP.
1 2051, 2061.
17. Interstate trade was also held to be impaired in the trade exposition sector. By
prohibiting machine tool manufacturers (i.e., the Association's members) from dealing
with fair organizers in Community States other than that in which the Association's
biennial Trade Fair was held, the rules of the Trade Association CECIMO raised an
absolute barrier to interstate trade and were therefore capable of being reached under
the Grundig-Consten formulation of the single market test.
18. By limiting the freedom of manufacturers to participate in the other trade fairs
the agreement did not directly prevent these producers from dealing with potential
customers in other Member States. However, the added burdens placed on the manu-
facturer wishing to transact business with buyers located in other areas of the Common
Market (as a result of his having chosen to participate in the EEMO) could be said to
[Vol. 6: 163
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The contribution of the Machine-Tool holding to the expansion of
the Grundig-Consten single market test is more easily understood when
formulated in general terms. After Machine-Tool, a suspect restraint
is vulnerable to Commission jurisdiction if it serves to increase the
logistical difficulties of a party wishing to transact business with potential
trading partners located some distance away.
A comparison of the obstacles to economic interpenetration raised in
Machine-Tool with those presented by agreements such as the one in
Grundig-Consten leads to the conclusin that either the Grundig-Consten
test has been given expanded meaning, 19 or that a new test has been
developed to deal with the horizontal restraints. This latter possibility
seems to have been erased, however, by the Commission's language in
Machine-Tool:
The obstacles to the providing of services with respect to the organization of
fairs and expositions and to transactions relating to machine tools between the
countries of the Common Market are therefore capable of jeopardizing directly
free trade between Member States in such a way as to be detrimental to the
realization of the objectives of a single market between the States.20
In the International Quinine Cartel caseal the various agreements and
concerted practices resulted in four distinct restraints, conveniently
catalogued as market protection, market sharing (export quotas), 'limita-
tion of production, and price fixing. The market protection agreement,
restrict his freedom to engage in interstate trade. As a direct consequence of the Asso-
ciation's rules, it became necessary for sellers to undertake costly procedures for the
purpose of promoting exposure and facilitating contacts in order to reach buyers that
could have been reached with less difficulty had the sellers been permitted to exhibit
at other fairs. The barrier to economic interpenetration was less than absolute, yet the
Commission found that it sufficiently threatened the realization of a single market.
19. The test may be said to have been expanded in the sense that, after Machine-Tool,
less of a restraint on freedom to participate in trade between the Member States was
required before the Commission would be competent to exercise its jurisdiction over a
particular cartel.
20. Commission Decision of March 13, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Develop-
ments] CCH Comm. Mr. REP. 9295, at 8629, 8 Comm. Mkt. LR. DI, D9 (Comm'n
of the EEC 1969) (emphasis added).
21. Commission Dedsion of July 16, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Develop-
ments] CCH Comm. MaT. REP. 9315, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D41 (Comm'n of the EEC
1969) [hereinafter cited as International Quinine]. The six enterprises involved held a
dominant position on the European Common Market as wel as on the world market.
The restrictive agreement covered the manufacture and distribution of two quinine
products, providing for a uniform price increase of fifty percent in 1964, protection of
the three home markets against exports from other members of the cartel, institution of
export quotas with respect to the three unprotected markets within the Community, and
limitation of the French members to the production of only one of the quinine prod-
ucts. The Commission found that the firms agreed to continue their restrictive practices
despite expert legal advice warning that their actions were illegal under Article 85(I).
The case marked the first time that the Commission had elected to impose fines (ranging
from $10,000 to $210,000) because of the serious nature of the violations.
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in which each of the six producers agreed not to export into the national
territories of the other producers, placed a direct restraint on the
freedom of the manufacturers to deal with potential trading, partners
in other Member States, thereby violating the interstate trade clause.22
Similarly, the export quotas23 and limitation of production provisions
24
were capable of raising an impenetrable barrier to trade between poten-
tial trading partners in different States. Thus, with respect to three of
the restraints, the Commission was able to find a jurisdictional basis
under the interstate trade dause without simultaneously expanding the
single market test. The price-fixing agreement, however, posed a more
difficult problem.
The simultaneous increase of prices by the same amount for similar
products manufactured by the six members of the cartel may have had
an effect on the trading position of potential customers in the unpro-
tected countries, but it is clear that this aspect of the restrictive agree-
ment, considered apart from the other restraints, did not erect an insur-
mountable barrier to trade between any potential trading partners. It
may be said that the pricing agreement removed from potential pur-
chasers the opportunity to shop around for the best possible price and,
in that sense, amounted to a restraint on freedom to engage in interstate
trade. Even so, it is difficult to see how an impairment of this nature
could satisfy the criteria of the single market test.25
22. This is a simple application of the Grundig-Consten test to a restraint which
raises an insurmountable barrier to economic interpenetration in the quinine products
sector.
23. Pursuant to the agreement, a party who found his market position slipping in
the unprotected countries could prevent the other producers from exporting freely into
such markets until an equalization of quantities was reached. Although none of the
parties had exercised his right to equalization of quantities, the system was considered
to be likely to impair trade between the Member States.
24. The prohibition preventing the French enterprises from producing any quinidine
amounted to a direct and complete bar to their freedom to deal in quinidine with buy-
ers in other States.
25. Irrespective of whether the manufacturers decided to raise prices simultaneously,
purchasers in Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy would of necessity have to buy quinine
products from manufacturers in other Member States. The only curtailment of trading
freedom which stemmed from the pricing agreement involved the buyers' freedom to
select which seller to deal with, but inasmuch as there were no sellers of quinine in the
unprotected Member States the restraint did not raise any significant barrier to eco-
nomic interpenetration. The only negative effect the agreement could possibly have
had with respect to interstate trade would have been a reduction in demand for quinine
products, which would have resulted in a decrease in volume of trade in that sector.
Yet, in Grundig-Consten, this test was specifically rejected as a criterion under the
interstate trade clause:
Thus the fact that an agreement helps to bring about a considerable increase
in the volume of trade between Member States is not sufficient to preclude the
(Vol. 6: 163
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In ruling that the pricing agreement was capable of affecting trade
between the Member States, the Commission could have been giving
effect to any one of three principles. First, there is language in the
opinion which suggested that the price-fixing aspect of the cartel was not
considered apart from the other restrictive practices.26 On this basis the
holding of the case could be interpreted to mean that it is the combina-
tion of price-fixing and market protection agreements that is violative
of the interstate trade clause.2 7
A second way of looking at the Commission's holding is to recognize
a judicial expansion of the'single market test. By curtailing the freedom
of buyers to choose between the different brands of quinine products-
by effectively neutralizing price considerations-the pricing agreement
prejudiced the realization of a single market between the Member
States. However, this could be true only if the concept of a single market
encompassed notions of a market in which there was active competition
between sellers. To introduce into the single market notion criteria
which measure the freedom of purchasers to engage in interstate trade
according to the breadth of choice offered by sellers with whom they
may otherwise freely transact business, would be to give the single"
market test an expanded meaning and new significance.28
possibility that such agreement can "affect" trade within the meaning [of the
single market test].
Consten and Grundig v. E.E.C. Commission, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder: Court Dei-
sions] CCH CoMm. MKT. REP. 8046, at 7652, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418, 472 (Eur. Ct.
of Justice 1966).
26. These agreements on prices and on the protection of national markets, which
complemented each other, erected barriers to trade and prevented buyers from
obtaining the benefits they would have enjoyed in a competitive situation that
was free from agreements.
Commission Decision of July 16, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Developments]
CCH Comm. MT. REP. 9313, at 8682, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D41, D68 (Comm'n of the
EEC 1969).
27. The principal objection to this construction of the Commission's ruling is that the
market protection restraint was itself capable of impairing interstate trade; consideration
of the pricing agreement in connection with the protection scheme is merely repetitive
and amounts to a denial that pricing agreements are capable of producing negative
effects of their own. It is therefore better to conclude that nothing authoritative was
said about the effect of the pricing agreement.
28. In the Henkel-Colgate case--Commission Decision of December 23, 1971, 2 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 9491, - Comm. Mkt. L.R. - (Comm'n of the EEC 1971)-the Com-
mission had before it a joint research and development agreement between an Amer-
ican firm, Colgate-Palmolive, and a German firm, Henkel, the third and fourth largest
firms in the world engaging in the manufacture and distribution of laundry soaps and
detergents. Henkel products are manufactured and distributed by companies in four
different countries; Colgate laundry soaps and detergents are manufactured and dis.
tributed by Colgate subsidiaries in three countries. Pursuant to the agreement, a joint
research and development company was to be established in Switzerland. The Commis-
sion found an impairment of interstate trade where the sole curtailment of freedom,
1973]
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Third, it is reasonable to conclude from an examination of the decision
that the Commission has developed a new standard for measuring the
potential effects of pricing agreements on interstate trade. This result
follows from the Commission's statement that the agreements
... concern all the Member States of the Community and they must be con-
sidered as capable of threatening the freedom of international trade in quinine
and quinidine in a manner detrimental to the proper functioning of the Com-
mon Market.29
D. THE DyXsTu rs CASE
In Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. E.E.C. Commission,80 the
Court of Justice affirmed the Commission's ruling that the concerted
practices in which I.C.I. had participated had resulted in adverse effects
on trade between the Member States. Unlike the pricing agreement in
International Quinine, the Dyestuffs restraint was unaccompanied by
other dearly illegal restrictive practices and, accordingly, the Dyestuffs
amounted to the imposition on potential buyers in other Member States of the neces-
sity of choosing between Procter & Gamble and Unilever soaps on the one hand, and
soaps produced by Henkel and Colgate-Palmolive on the other. Presumably the choice
involves an impair-ment of freedom becaue the goods sold by the latter companies were
placed on the market following tainted commercial efforts at the production stage (by
reason of the firms' agreement to pool resources for purposes of research and develop-
ment). See note 56 and accompanying text, infra. It is difficult to discern in Henkel-
Colgate how freedom to engage in interstate trade has been affected, and assuming that
that problem is capable of being overcome, how the realization of a single market has
been prejudiced. In light of not only the Commission's neglect to dwell upon the inter-
state trade issue, but also its apparent haste to grant an exemption under Article 85(3),
Henkel-Colgate cannot be relied upon with confidence as standing for any proposition
concerning the interstate trade clause.
29. Commission Decision of July 16, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Develop-
ments] CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 9313, at 8682, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D41, D67 (Comm'n
of the EEC 1969) (emphasis added). That this "proper functioning" test represents a
new approach to dealing with restraints under the interstate trade clause is buttressed
by the language quoted at note 26, supra, to the effect that by denying buyers the bene-
fits they would have had in a market free from restrictive agreements the restraint had
the effect of impairing interstate trade.
30. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. E..C. Commission, 2 CCH Comm. MKT.
RP,. 8161, - Comm. Mkt. L.R. - (Eur. Ct. of Justice July 14, 1972), aff'g Commis-
sion Decision of July 24, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Developments] CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 9314, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D23 (Comm'n of the EEC 1969) [herein-
after cited as Dyestuffs]. The case marked the first time that a prohibition was extended
beyond Community boundaries to companies with headquarters in non-Member na-
tions. The Commission found that ten manufacturers of dyestuf from the United King-
dom, Switzerland, Germany, France, and Italy, together with their subsidiaries in various
Member States, had adopted concerted pricing practices for goods which they sold within
the Common Market. Having ruled that the concerted price increases amounted to a
distortion of competition within the meaning of Article 85(1), the Commission then
found that the restraint had impaired interstate trade, that it produced the requisite
domestic effects, and that it was therefore capable of being struck down. The Court of
Justice affirmed the Commission decision, which had been appealed by the British
firm I.CI., and the enterprises were fined the equivalent of $50,000 each.
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facts provide a context more conducive to examination of the special
issues raised in connection with the application of the interstate trade
dause to price-fixing.81 It is dear that the concerted price increases had
no effect on the freedom of the potential trading partners to transact
business with each other; pricing practices do not normally erect an
absolute barrier to economic interpenetration. However, by neutralizing
the price factor, the concerted practice effectively robbed buyers of a
principal ground for distinguishing between available brands. In this
way the restraint imposed limitations on the buyers' freedom to select
suitable trading partners. Do these limitations amount to the restraint
of freedom to participate in interstate trade? Is the realization of a
single, Community-wide market threatened? It could reasonably be found
that since a primary factor in what motivates buyers to look to foreign
(other Member State) rather than domestic sellers had been nullified, the
restrictive practice impaired buyers' freedom to engage in interstate
trade.82 In seeking to evaluate this impairment for purposes of the
single market test, it will be helpful to recall the precedents which
might apply.
Insofar as the barrier to economic interpenetration raised by the
concerted price increases was appreciably less than absolute, the Grundig-
Consten case is of little value as a precedent. Similarly, the concerted
practice could not be struck down under the market protection, market
sharing, or production limitation restraints of the International Quinine
case, since these also involved obstacles which precluded certain groups
of potential trading partners from dealing with each other. Nor would
the pricing practices be violative of the single market test under the
ruling in Machine-Tool. The Dyestuffs restraints did not operate to
increase the logistical difficulties of the buyer wishing to transact busi-
ness with sellers located some distance away.83 However, depending
31. The market sector under investigation in the Dyestuffs case involved trade in
various coloring products. Insofar as the concerted Price increases amounted to a hori-
zontal restraint the Commission was obliged to consider trade in all brands of dyestuffs.
The potential trading partners included British, Swiss, German, French, and Italian
manufacturers and their subsidiaries on the one hand, and buyers throughout the Com-
mon Market on the other. The single market test in this context requires focusing on
the freedom of the buyers to engage in interstate trade.
32. The difficulty of applying the "freedom of interstate trade" standard to facts such
as those in Dyestufs is a clear indication that the Grundig-Consten test may not be well-
suited to measuring all types of restraints. In the Dyestuffs case, the Commission facedfor the first time in a major case a restrictive practice not designed to partition the
Common Market along State boundary lines.
33. In the dyestuffs industry, there are great logistical problems associated with the
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upon the interpretation given to the Commission's position regarding
the pricing agreement, it is possible to find in International Quinine a
ruling of precedential value. If it is concluded that the Commission
could not meaningfully have considered the pricing aspect of the case
apart from the other restraints, then the concerted practices in Dyestuifs
present a case of first impression. If, however, International Quinine is
seen as embodying an expanded single market test, or if it is regarded
as having set forth a new standard for the evaluation of restraints under
the interstate trade clause, then the Dyestuffs practices may be reached
in accordance with the earlier holding.3 4
The Dyestuffs tribunals, faced with the choice of applying an expanded
single market test, formulating a new test, or even giving support to
the new test which is arguably presented in International Quinine,
responded by not giving explicit recognition to any test. In the Com-
mission decision it was held that interstate trade was likely to be
affected not only because the practices applied to all goods sold within
the dyestuffs sector (those being imported from other Member States
as well as goods produced domestically), but also by reason of the
uniform and simultaneous nature of the price increases. The Commission
emphasized that the intended purpose of the concerted practices was
to prevent users from switching suppliers. The Commission equated this
intent with an intent to prevent users from importing dyestuffs from
other Member States. 5 Note that the Commission did not seem to be
concerned as much with obstacles to economic interpenetration between
the Member States as it was disturbed by the tendency of the concerted
practices to regulate the channels that trade in the dyestuffs sector would
follow. This was supported by the observation that many of the pro-
ducers were active in each of the national markets.
decision of a buyer to purchase from a foreign manufacturer; the pricing areement
however, did nothing to increase these difficulties. This is in contrast to Machine-Tool,
where the agreement required sellers to undertake costly procedures for promoting
exposure and facilitating contacts in order to reach buyers that could have been reached
with less difficulty had the sellers been permitted to exhibit at other fairs.
34. The Dyestuffs price increases, like those in International Quinine, deprived buy.
ers of the opportunity to shop among competitive brands for the best price. Whether
this violates criterialocked within the concept of a single market or the same criteria
under a new test, the fact of a violation under principles enunciated in International
Quinine remains.
35. The Commission's position on this issue is set forth in Commission Decision of
July 24, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Developments] CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9814, at 8692, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D23, DS0 (Comm'n of the EEC 1969). The Com-
mission also rejected the argument raised by the manufacturers that, because of the
special nature of the dyestuffs industry, intra.Community trade in that sector was im-
possible.
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In affirming the Commission's ruling, the Court of Justice likewise
considered the incriminating feature of the pricing practices to be their
mollifying effect on the buyers' propensity to consider switching to
another supplier. The Court's language indicated that new criteria
were being applied.86 The price increases "could have an adverse effect
on the conditions under which the trade in dyestuffs between Member
States takes place."87 The practices served to "strengthen market posi-
tions"88 already acquired. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
practices "helped to 'cement' further the division of national markets,
to the detriment of truly free trade in dyestuffs within the Common
Market."89
Whether or not these criteria are held to be features of the single
market test or part of some other test is not of crucial import; in either
case they are criteria to be considered in applying the interstate trade
clause. What is significant about these formulations is that they bring
into the concept of "unimpaired trade between the Member States"
criteria which had previously been absent. Although the Court maintains
contact with the older test,40 it shifts its focal point slightly from the
"interstate" aspect of trade to criteria in the concept of "truly free
trade within the Common Market." The change in emphasis allows the
Commission, with the Court's implicit approval, to exercise jurisdiction
over restrictive agreements and practices which impose no limitations on
36. [I.C.I.] maintains that the uniform price increases could not impair trade
between Member States, since despite the substantial differences between the
prices applied in the various States, consumers have always preferred to pur-
chase their dyestuffs on the domestic market. ... [H]owever,... the concerted
practices, which were designed to maintain the partitioning of the market,
could have an adverse effect on the conditions under which the trade in dye-
stuffs between Member States takes place. The enterprises applying these prac-
tices intended, at the time of each price increase, to reduce to a minimum the
risk of a change in the conditions of competition. The uniform and simul-
taneous nature of the price increases served mainly to prevent customers of
the various enterprises from switching suppliers and to strengthen market
positions thus acquired. In this way it also helped to "cement" further the
division of traditional national markets, to the detriment of truly free trade in
dyestuffs within the Common Market.
Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd.-v. E.E.C. Commission, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. REP.




39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Note how the Court tries to find a partitioning along national boundaries. The
facts of the case, however, defy such an exclusive characterization. A more realistic
analysis reveals a partitioning of the market along traditional channels of commercial
intercourse.
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the freedom to participate in interstate trade. The Commission is still
bound to find an impairment of freedom of trade, but without the
further qualification that interstate trade be impaired.
The ultimate significance of this development, in terms of its effect on
the expansion of Community law jurisdiction, is that for Community
law to apply, it need only be found that channels of trade within the
Common Market have been subjected to private regulation. This re-
quirement is less stringent than the requirement that the restraint raise
significant barriers to economic interpenetration between the Member
States. For the non-Community enterprise this signals the beginning of
a new phase in Community cartel law, a period in which activity of a
"foreign trade" nature will no longer be shielded from the provisions of
Article 85(l), irrespective of whether or not it operates to inhibit inter-
state trade.
11
REQUIREMENT (2): COMPETITION WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET
A. ThE BAsic IssuE
At this juncture it would be prudent to recall that it is not the
purpose of this investigation to discuss the substantive antitrust law
which has evolved as a consequence of judicial interpretation of Require-
ment (1), the clause requiring a "distortion of competition within the
Common Market."4' Rather, the focal point of the inquiry will be to
explore the meaning given by Community tribunals to the territorial
component of the clause, namely the requirement that a restraint have
effects on "competition within the Common Market."42 There are two
problems to be dealt with in interpreting the "domestic effects" clause.
First, the concept of "competition" must be examined and its essential
features identified; and secondly, criteria must be found which indicate
when competition may be said to be within the Common Market.48 Be-
41. The predse language of Article 85(1), supra note 1, makes illegal restrictive aree-
ments and practices "which are designed to prevent, restrict or distort competition
within the Common Market or which have this effect."
42. In the discussion of the three requirements which constitute Article 85(1), supra
note 1 and accompanying text, the requirement that competition within the Common
Market be restrained was Requirement (2). It is referred to throughout this section as
the "domestic effects" clause.
43. That the "domestic effects" clause sets forth abstract legal criteria and not a
straightforward factual standard is apparent from its inability to provide, by itself, a
clear answer to such questions as whether the condition is satisfied where competition
is restrained between a Common Market firm and a non-Community firm.
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cause these issues have received only scant attention in the case law to
date, and because of the complexity of the interpretive problems.
involved, it will be helpful to consider the following analytical frame-
work.
Competition is distorted when a commercial effort is shielded to some
degree from market forces which, had they been allowed to influence
the effort, would have encouraged maximization of quality and efficiency
and minimization of price.44 Any marketed good comes to the market
as the fruit of a bundle of separate commercial efforts, which correspond
roughly to the various stages in the history of the product. Competition
may be distorted with respect to any of these efforts. The different com-
mercial efforts represented by a final product may be undertaken by
the same firm, or by different firms; they may all be carried on at one
location, or they may occur at several differetit locations. When competi-
tion is distorted with respect to any of the-commercial efforts required
for production and distribution of a given product, the quality and
price of that product are likely to be affected. Hence, competition in a
particular market sector refers to the competitive nature of the various
commercial efforts aimed at preparing the products in that sector for
sale. When the Commission suspects that competition in the sector is
distorted, it must find that one or more of the commercial efforts of one
or more competitors45 has been protected from market pressures that
44. This is not meant to be an authoritative definition of the concept of competition;
nor is it to be understood as representing the definition used by Community tribunals.
Its sole purpose is to provide a starting point from which to examine the problem of
identifying to what activity the Commission refers when it rules that competition has
been distorted. This problem is the initial hurdle that must be overcome in order to
reduce "competition" to its geographical situs.
45. When a vertical restraint is under consideration, such as that found in the
Grundig-Consten case, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder: Court Decisions] CCH COMM. MKT.
REP. 8046, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418 (Eur. Ct. of Justice 1966), competition may be
restrained at several levels. If the market sector is narrowly defined to be Grundig radios,
then competition may be found to be distorted at the distributorship level; it is -the
commercial effort of the distributor Consten that has been artificially relaxed. Note
that "distortion of competition" in this context manifests itself in one of the com-
petitors having an unfair advantage. This means that the Commission may find that
competition is distorted by examining the commercial efforts undertaken by just one
competitor. Similarly, by asuming an expanded definition of the pertinent market
sector, e.g., radios of all brands, the Commission could find a distortion of competition
by looking solely to the commercial efforts undertaken by the manufacturer Grundig.
Yet it would not be necessary to find distortion at the production level to assess Grundig,
because as one of the parties to the restrictive agreement it is responsible for the effects
of the agreement on the commercial efforts undertaken by Consten, and may be reached
on that basis. In its decision in BWguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export Co., 2 CCH
Com. MAKT. R P. 8149, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 81 (Eur. Ct. of Justice 1971), the Court
of Justice held that a Japanese manufacturer participating in an exclusive distributor-
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would otherwise influence that effort. Thus, when it turns to the applica-
tion of the "domestic effects" clause, the Commission has already made
a judgment about the competitive nature of the suspect commercial
effort. Having appropriately separated it from the bundle of other
commercial efforts represented by the final product and having identified
the firm responsible therefor, the Commission must next ascertain
whether or not the tainted commercial effort was undertaken within the
territorial confines of the Common Market. With these findings in mind
the Commission may then decide whether the restraint has affected
"competition within the Common Market" within the meaning of
Article 85(1).
B. THE MINIM. DomEmslc SALE REQUIRnMNT
At the very least, the "domestic effects" clause requires that goods
which are the subject of a restrictive agreement be destined for sale on a
market within the territorial borders of the EEC. This follows from the
Commission's decision in the DECA case,4 o where it was held that
restraints which are designed to provide Common Market firms with a
competitive advantage in markets lying outside Community boundaries
are excluded from the reach of Article 85(l).47 In light of the above
ship agreement with a Belgian import company would be subject to the application
of Article 85(1) prohibitions if the agreement had its effects within the territory of the
Common Market.
46. Re the Rules of the D(utch) E(ngineers) and C(ontractors) A(ssociation), Commis-
sion Decision of October 22, 1964, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2412.31, 4 Comm. Mkt.L. 50 (Comm'n of the EEC 1964). The purpose of the DECA group's rules was tofacilitate for its members the procurement of construction contracts outside of theCommon Market. It was found that the rules required the collaboration of the par-ticipants only in markets outside the territory governed by the Treaty of Rome and
that they in no way produced effects within the Common Market. The decision reflects
the hesitance of the Commission in its early days to stretch its jurisdiction in antitrust
matters to the fullest permissible extent. Taken literally the words "competition within
the Common Market" would seemingly apply to the commercal efforts of firms domi-
ciled within the Community, irrespective of the destination of the goods or servicesinvolved. The fact that restraints such as the one in DECA would not be likely to
affect interstate trade may have influenced the Commission in its decision. Anotherfactor would be the natural inclination to apply competition rules lightly where exports
are involved.47. In a series of vertical agreement cases, the Commission was concerned with
whether an agreement conferring exclusive rights by a firm domiciled within a Mem-ber State upon a non-Community firm would be likely to affect competition within theCommon Market. In the early Grosfillex case, Commission Decision of March 11, 1964,
1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 2412.37, 3 Comm. Mkt. LR. 237 (Comm'n of the EEC
1964). the Commission held that an exclusive distributorship given by a French firm
to a Swiss firm would probably not violate the domestic effects clause because the
tainted commercial effort on the part of the Swiss firm would not be likely to affect
a product to be sold within the Common Market. This reasoning was amplified in the
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analysis of the meaning of "competition," the DECA domestic sale
criterion would be expressed as. follows: The Commission has found
that, at some point in the history of the product being considered, one
of the commercial undertakings from which the product is descended
was tainted by a lack of unrestrained competition. The product itself is
therefore tainted. When the product is placed for sale on one of the
markets in the EEC, where it will compete with other untainted
products, competition within the Common Market is affected. To apply
Article 85(1), the Commission, under the domestic sale test, need only
find a tainted commercial effort somewhere in the history of a product
which is sold within the Common Market.48 However, it is by no means
clear from examination of the case law under Article 85(l) that the
DECA test is the sole criterion to be applied under the "domestic effects"
clause.
C. TAINTED COMMERCIAL EFFORTS WITHIN THE COMMION MARKET
If one were to look at the factual bases underlying the vast majority
of cases in which it was found that "competition within the Common
recent Raymond-Nagoya case, Commission Decision of June 9, 1972, 2 CCH CoMm. MKT.
REP. 9513, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D45 (Comm'n of the EEC 1972), where the Commis-
sion implied that competition within the Common Market would be affected only if
Nagoya, the exclusive Japanese licensee of the French licensor, Raymond, were to ex-
port its products into the Common Market. Another way in which a vertical agreement
involving goods destined for sale outside the Common Market could be found to pro-
duce the requisite domestic effects was explored in the Rieckermann case, Commission
Decision of November 6, 1968, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder:. New Developments] CCH
Comm. MKT. REP. 9267, 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D78 (Comm'n of the EEC 1968). In
Rieckermann, the German manufacturer AEG-Elotherm granted an exclusive dis-
tributorship to the German exporter, Rieckermann, for the AEG products destined for
sale on the Japanese market. The decision points out that, since Rieckermann was pro-
hibited from buying equipment destined for export to Japan from AEG-Elotherm's
competitors, competition within the Common Market (in the form of the commercial
efforts undertaken by AEG-Elotherm) could possibly be distorted. No such effects were
found however. The crucial distinction between Rieckermann on the one hand, and
Grosfillex and Raymond-Nagoya on the other, is that in Rieckermann, the goods were
to be sold once within the Common Market on their way to an ultimate sale in Japan.
48. It can be seen from this formulation that it is important to determine whether
the domestic sale test is the sole criterion contained within the "domestic effects" clause,
or whether it merely states a minimal condition that must be satisfied before the further
requirements of the clause may be considered. Assuming that it is the sole criterion,
the DECA test would enable the Commission to reach non-Community firms whose
tainted commercial efforts were carried on completely outside the Common Market,
simply by finding that the effort contributed to the production or distribution of a
product that was destined to be sold within the Common Market. There are other
issues, however, that would arise in connection with the DECA test. For example, would
it be necessary that the firm undertaking a tainted commercial effort know that the
article was destined for sale in the Common Market? It would also have to be found,
of course, that the agreement or practice which shielded the tainted commercial effort
from natural market forces was likely to affect interstate trade.,
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Market" had been affected, it would appear that, beyond the minimal
domestic sale criterion, a showing that the tainted commercial efforts
had in fact taken place within the Common Market was required.
Indeed, for most of the cases the requirement could have been so strong
as to necessitate the undertaking of imperfect commercial efforts within
the Common Market by Common Market firms.4 9 Yet the decision in
the Machine-Tool case50 suggests that tainted commercial activity of
non-Community firms would also be prohibited.51 The Commission's
response to a written question expressing concern about restrictive
agreements which involved American and Japanese companies and
which were the subject of a United States Department of Justice prosecu-
tion indicated that the Commission could intervene only when "the
agreements have an effect on the conduct of these enterprises in the
Common Market." 52 The obvious question posed by these developments
is to what extent must the firm's conduct take place within the Common
Market? At this stage in the development of Community cartel law, the
question has hardly been approached. Accordingly, it will be helpful
to consider, in terms of the preceding commercial efforts analysis, some
of the problems which are likely to force the Community tribunals to
develop new criteria.
Assuming that the "domestic effects" clause requires that a firm's
conduct within the Common Market be affected by a distortion of
competition,53 may the requirement be met if the commercial effort
49. The Grundig-Consten case, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder: Court Decisions] CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. 8046, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418 (Eur. Ct. of Justice 1966), would be
a good example of a vertical restraint meeting this standard.
50. Commission Decision of March 13, 1969, [1965-1969 Transfer Binder: New Devel-
opments] CCH COMM. MaT. REP. 9295, 8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D1 (Comm'n of the EEC
1969).
51. Hypothetically, if the Commission were to focus on the competitive relationship
between a large Swiss manufacturer, whose acumen and resources allowed it to carry
on substantial sales activity outside the exposition circuit, and a small French producer,
struggling to break into the market and needing to capitalize on every opportunity for
exposure, it could find that the restrictive agreement had the effect of distorting com-
petition between the two firms. If the added market pressure created by the French
firm and others like it being permitted to exhibit their machine tools at local exposi-
tions, is prevented from influencing the S9wiss manufacturer's commercial efforts, then
those efforts are not likely to be carried on in a fully competitive spirit. It is not made
clear in the decision which of these tainted efforts would need to be carried on inside
the EEC before the agreement could be found to have effects on "competition within
the Common Market."
52. Commission Response to Written Question No. 226/70, 2 CCH COMM. MKT. REP.
9402, at 8880 (1970). The United States prosecution referred to is United States v.
Westinghouse, Case No. 2095, TRADE REG. REP. 45,070 (1970).
53. It always remains a possibility that the Commission will adopt a liberal approach
with respect to its competence and require only that the "affected" product be sold
within the Common Market
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which is found to be tainted was carried on outside the Community?54
Another problem involves the number of competitors whose conduct
within the Common Market must be affected. Where the restraint is in
the form of a vertical agreement, competition is distorted by one firm's
being granted an advantage over its competitors. The Commission need
only consider the commercial efforts of one firm in order to determine
whether or not the restraint affects competition in the Common Market. 55
The situation is different, however, if a horizontal restraint is under
investigation. Because this form of restrictive agreement is typically made
by competing enterprises, the Commission could conceivably require
that the restraint affect the commercial efforts of both parties to the
agreement, and that the tainted efforts of each party be undertaken
within the Common Market.
In the Henkel-Colgate case5 6 both of the competitors carried on sub-
stantial amounts of activity within the Common Market. Assuming that
the Commission would find Henkel guilty of imperfect commercial effort
at the production level as a result of the joint research and development
agreement, would it be precluded from applying Article 85(l) if Colgate-
Palmolive were less active in the contract territory?5T These and other
54. In the factual context posed by the Machine-Toot case, it is possible that the re-
strictive agreement would affect the Swiss manufacturer's commercial efforts only at the
production stage. If these efforts were undertaken in Switzerland, would commercial
efforts carried on in the Common Market at the distribution level, even if untainted,
be enough to satisfy the requirements of the "domestic effects" clause? Or must the im-
perfect commercal effort itself be undertaken within the Common Market before the
agreement may be said to have the requisite "domestic effects'?
55. See note 45 supra.
56. Commission Decision of December 23, 1971, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. RE1P. 9491,
- Comm. Mkt. L.R. - (Comm'n of the EEC 1971). The Commission found that the
agreement had the effect of eliminating competition between the parties in the field
of research. See note 28 supra. It also found that by agreeing to the joint utilization of
the research, the contracting parties gave up "the possibility of competing with one
another on the market by making effective use of the improvements in production re-
sulting from individual research to gain an advantage over the other party." 2 CCH
COMM. Mar.T. REP. 9491, at 9056-57, - Comm. Mkt. L.R. - at - (1971). Thus, it is the
commercial efforts undertaken by Henkel at the production level and the corresponding
efforts undertaken by Colgate-Palmolive that the Commission finds to be marked by
imperfect competition. On the facts of the case, each of these efforts was carried on
within the Common Market. As a result, the Commission found that the conditions of
the "domestic effects" clause had been satisfied. Although it also found that the agree-
ment was capable of impairing trade between the Member States, the parties were
allowed to pursue the restraint, since it qualified for exemption under Article 85(3).
57. If, for example, Colgate had agreed not to sell its products within the Common
Market, on the understanding that Henkel would refrain from selling its products in
one of Colgate's favorite markets, would competition within the Common Market be
affected? Or if Colgate carried on its production in the United States and did not have
subsidiaries in the Common Market for distribution purposes, would the relaxing of
competition be an effect on competition "within the Common Market"? In Commission
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problems depend for their answers upon further refinement of competi-
tion policy by the various Community organs. Until that time the best
that can be done is to frame the issues in a manner conducive to
identifying and understanding the problems faced by the decision-makers.
D. THE DYEsTuFFs CASE
In the Dyestuffs case58 the Court of Justice upheld the Commission
finding that certain concerted practices with respect to pricing had the
effect of restricting competition between ten producers of coloring
materials. Yet before the practices could be held to violate the prohibi-
tions of Article 85(1), it had to be found that they affected competition
within the Common Market. In arriving at the conclusion that competi-
tion in the dyestuffs industry was distorted, the Commission had to
isolate and identify the various commercial efforts that had been, or
were intended to be, tainted.
As a result of the concerted price increases, manufacturers were freed
from the necessity of having to keep prices at a competitive level in order
to maintain their market positions.5 9 The effects of this artificial freedom
would presumably be reflected in a relaxation of commercial effort at
the various stages of production and distribution which were under the
manufacturer's control.60 In the case of the six Community-established
producers, the imperfect commercial efforts were carried on entirely
within the EEC. But with respect to the three Swiss producers and I.C.I.
(United Kingdom), some of the tainted efforts must have been carried
on outside of Community boundaries. The decisions do not specify
which of I.C.I.'s commercial efforts were within and which were without
Decision of July 30, 1964, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 2412.46, 3 Comm. Pkt. L.R. 505(Comm'n of the EEC 1964) the Commission held that an agreement between a British
firm and a French firm pursuant to which each agreed not to engage in intrabrand
competition in the other's territory affected competition within the Common Market.
However, a negative clearance was granted on the ground that the effects were imper-
ceptible. It is not clear that the same result would have been reached, i.e., that Com-
munity competition would be affected, if the agreement had involved interbrand com-
petition.
58. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. E.E.C. Commission, 2 CCH COMM. MRT.
REP. 8161, - Comm. TMkt. L.R. - (Eur. Ct. of Justice July 14, 1972).
59. If a manufacturer wished to increase his thare of the market he would have to
become more competitive with respect to quality and customer service. The Commission
held that even though competition was not restricted at these levels, freedom of com-
petition in regard to pricing was distorted and that was sufficient to satisfy the stan.
dards of Article 85(1).
60. Because of the peculiar nature of the dyestuffs sector, the manufacturers tended
to control most, if not all, of the stages of production and distribution.
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the EEC, but it must be presumed, because of the presence of I.C.I.
subsidiaries in several of the Member States, that its activities within the
Common Market were substantial.6' On these facts the Commission held,
and the Court of Justice affirmed, that the restrictive practices affected
competition within the Common Market. How is that holding to be
defined?
It is obvious that the minimal domestic sale criterion is satisfied
by the Dyestuffs case facts. Prices were increased for coloring materials
that were sold within the Common Market to Community buyers. But
it cannot be assumed that this finding alone would meet the require-
ments of the "domestic effects" clause.62 Because the Commission did
not identify the factors contributing to a nexus between the distorted
competition and the territory of the EEC that were the most important
in enabling it to hold that competition had been affected within the
Common Market, we are reduced once more to speculation.63 Was it
enough that the Commission could find tainted commercial efforts
carried on within the Community by German, French, and Italian pro-
ducers? If so, the "domestic effects" clause could be satisfied in the case
of horizontal as well as vertical restraints without examining the
commercial efforts of all the competitors involved. If not, the problem
would be one of determining how much of I.C.I.'s imperfect commercial
effort was carried on within the confines of the EEC before I.C.I. could
be fined. If, for example, I.C.I. did not have subsidiaries in the various
Member States, would the fact that its tainted efforts contributed to
the manufacture of products sold in the EEC be sufficient to bring the
firm within the Commission's grasp, assuming that the tainted efforts of
I.C.I.'s competitors were undertaken within the Common Market?
Greater certainty in answering these questions will have to await
future decisions.
61. The same must be true of the Swiss firms, although the opinions were not predse
on this issue. The subsidiaries may have been involved in production; it is almost cer-
tain that they were responsible for distribution and customer service.
62. Neither the Commission nor the Court explicitly so held, and the facts make it
clear that domestic sales were not the only connection that existed between the tainted
commercial efforts and the Common Market.
63. The critical issue in the Dyestuffs case, as far as the extraterritorial competence
of the Commission to fine I.C.I. was concerned, involved the extent to which the pro-
hibited price-fixing conduct took place within the Common Market. The Court held
that I.C.I. was guilty because it carried on its share of the concerted practices within the
EEC and because these practices affected competition there. The Court did not consider
whether or not this basis for holding I.CJ. would be sufficient if I.CJ.'s tainted com-
mercial efforts were carried on completely outside of Community boundaries.
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CONCLUSION
It was early established that the interstate trade clause was basically
jurisdictional, its chief function being to separate the respective realms
of application of Community and Member State antitrust law.64 As the
Commission expanded its jurisdiction under the interstate trade clause,
the single-market standard formulated in Grundig-Consten began to
betray the presence of criteria which have traditionally belonged to sub-
stantive antitrust law. The Commission gradually shifted the focal point
of its inquiry from the freedom of firms to participate in interstate trade
to their freedom to trade in an atmosphere of unrestrained competition.
The Dyestuffs holding sealed this transition with the formulation of
the truly free trade standard.65
Irrespective of any "substantive" criteria it may be said to contain, the
interstate trade clause serves primarily to define the sphere of Common
Market cartel law within the exclusive jurisdiction of Community, as
opposed to Member State, tribunals. Article 85(l) becomes operative
when a distortion of competition within the Common Market touches
upon interstate trade. Under the Dyesbuffs case, this "touching" require-
ment is satisfied if the restraint tends to regulate trade along established
channels of commercial intercourse, thereby cementing further the
division of national markets. The facts of the Dyestuffs case, however,
04. "The purpose of the concept of 'agreements liable to affect trade between Mem-
ber States' is to separate the respective fields of application of Community Law and of
national law in the matter of cartel law." Consten and Grundig v. E.E.C. Commission,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder: Court Decisions] CCH Com. MKT. REP. 8046, at 7652,
5 Comm. Mt. L.R. 418, 472 (Eur. Ct. of Justice 1966).
65. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. E..C. Commission, 2 CCH Comm. MT.
RrP. 8161, at 8030, - Comm. Mkt. L.R. - (Eur. Ct. of Justice July 14, 1972). To
apply the principles outlined in the Dyestuffs case the Commission must examine the
effects produced by a particular restraint on competition as mirrored in the breadth
of selection faced by potential buyers. The theory is that if competition is unrestrained
there will be greater interbrakud diversity with respect to price, quality, and service,
and purchasers will be more likely to switch brands. Inquiry into the choice faced by
Common Market buyers parallels very closely the sort of examination undertaken in
connection with the substantive component of Article 85(1), Requirement (1) (the dis-
tortion of competition clause). The parallel is so close that it may become difficult to
differentiate the substantive from the jurisdictional criteria.
Under the distortion of competition clause, the Commission is seeking to determine
whether Common Market buyers have the best possible selection, i.e., that which would
result from unrestrained competition between competing producers and distributors.
Under the interstate trade clause, using the Dyestuffs case's "truly free trade" standard,
the Commission is looking at the same facts, and is likewise searching for maximum
selectivity. In order to measure a buyer's propensity to switch brands, the inquiry must
ultimately turn to the quality of the competitive efforts underlying the various brands
placed on the-maket., -'- I I I
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indicate that the crucial factor is the effect of the restraint on the
propensity of traders to undertake new trading relationships; the
requirement that the market be divided along national boundaries has
become less significant. To the extent that this partitioning requirement
ceases to be the most important criterion under the interstate trade
clause, Article 85(1) will enjoy increased applicability to practices which,
although intended to give certain enterprises a competitive advantage,
were not designed to preserve the division of the Common Market into
separate national markets.
Requirement (2), the "domestic effects" clause, requires that a suspect
restraint be found to produce effects on competition within the Com-
mon Market before Community tribunals can have jurisdiction to
examine the legality of the restraint under Article 85(1). At the very
least, this means that the goods involved must be destined for sale on a
market within the territorial borders of the EEC. However, no decision
has held that this minimum "domestic sale" requirement is the only
criterion that must be satisfied under Requirement (2). Indeed, when
the cases are properly analyzed, it becomes apparent that the jurisdic-
tion of Community tribunals may well be circumscribed to a significantly
greater degree.
Though the cases to date have given scant attention to the issue,
it appears that competition within the Common Market is affected when
some imperfect commercial activity relating to the production and dis-
tribution of a product destined for sale in the Common Market takes
place within the EEC. A number of problems are raised by this formula-
tion, but these must remain unanswered for the time being. For the
non-Community firm interested in doing business in Europe, the resolu-
tion of these issues will result in the establishment of important
guidelines for the conduct of future business activity. Accordingly, a
basic understanding of the problems which will be faced by Community
tribunals in the near future is indispensable.
Michael E. Treacy
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